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Comparable-Worth Wage 
Adjustments and Female 
Employment in the State 
and Local Sector 
Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Cornell University and National 
Bureau of Economic Research 
Robert S. Smith, Cornell University 
Our paper simulates the likely effects of a comparable-worth wage- 
adjustment policy in the state and local sector on female employment 
in the sector. The simulation is based on estimates of within- 
occupation male/female substitution and across-occupation occu- 
pational employment substitution that we obtain using data from 
the 1980 Census of Population. 
I. Introduction 
Some two decades after the passage of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which together prohibit (among 
other things) sex discrimination in wages on any given job and sex 
discrimination in access to employment opportunities, it is still common 
to observe that on average females earn less than males, females are 
distributed across occupations in a quite different manner than males, 
and earnings in occupations that are dominated by females tend to be 
We are most grateful to Daniel Sherman and Richard Chaykowski for their 
research assistance and to Eileen Driscoll and Ann Gerken for their assistance 
in obtaining and manipulating the census of population files used in the paper. 
Without implicating them for what remains, we are grateful to numerous 
colleagues for their comments on earlier drafts. 
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lower than earnings in those dominated by males, even after controlling 
for traditional proxies for productivity.' The frustrations generated by 
these outcomes have led to pressure for the adoption of the principle of 
comparable worth, a principle that at least one participant inthe debate 
has called "the women's issue of the 1980s."2 
Put in simplest erms, proponents of comparable worth assert that 
jobs within a firm can be valued in terms of the skill, effort, and 
responsibility hey require as well as of the working conditions they 
offer. Two jobs would be said to be of comparable worth to a firm if 
they were comparable in terms of these characteristics. The principle of 
comparable worth asserts that, within a firm, jobs that are of comparable 
worth to the firm should receive qual compensation. 
While some efforts o implement comparable worth have taken place 
in the private sector, the major push for comparable worth has occurred 
in the state and local government sector.3 By the mid-1960s over a dozen 
states had passed comparable-worth legislation covering state employees, 
although these laws were rarely enforced. Starting with a 1974 Washington 
State study, a number of states have undertaken formal job-evaluation 
studies to see how their compensation systems mesh with the principle 
of comparable worth. In several cases, this has led to "voluntary" 
implementation f comparable worth through the legislative and collec- 
tive-bargaining processes (e.g., in Minnesota) or to federal court-ordered 
implementation (i  Washington).4 Comparable worth initiatives have 
also been undertaken atthe local level in numerous jurisdictions. Indeed, 
Minnesota passed a law in April 1984 requiring political subdivisions to 
do job evaluations and then to revise their compensation structure in 
accord with the principle of comparable worth. 
'See, e.g., Treiman and Hartmann (1981). 
2 This statement is attributed in a number of places to former Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission chair Eleanor Holmes Norton. 
For evidence of the spread of comparable worth in the state and local sector, 
see Cook (1983), National Committee on Pay Equity (1984), and Ehrenberg and 
Smith (in press). Explanations offered for why this push has occurred in the 
public sector include that public decision makers are more likely to be swayed 
by public opinion calling for such policies than are private profit-maximizing 
firms and that females represent a larger share of employment in the public than 
in the private sector. With respect to the latter point, payroll data from 
Employment and Earnings (U.S. Department of Labor 1983, tables BI, B3) indicate 
that 51.2% of all state and local government employees were females in 1982; 
the comparable figures for manufacturing and the total private nonagricultural 
sector were 31.9% and 42.6%, respectively. 
'In AFSCME v. State of Washington (770 F.2d 1401 [9th Cir. 1985]). This 
order was subsequently overturned by a federal court of appeals; the state and 
the union then entered into a voluntary agreement in February 1986 to begin to 
implement comparable worth effective April 1, 1986. 
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Given the growing importance of the concept of comparable worth 
in the state and local sector, an empirical analysis of some of the issues 
it raises is obviously in order. This paper focuses on a side effect of 
implementing comparable worth in the public sector that was not 
anticipated by comparable worth's proponents. Comparable-worth wage 
adjustments (CWWA) would likely alter at least four types of relative 
wages that public employers face. First, for any given function (e.g., 
police protection) and within any major occupational group (e.g., clerical) 
the average wage of female employees (e.g., secretaries) would rise 
relative to the average wage of male employees (e.g., radio dispatchers), 
as some female employees would be in the detailed occupational group 
(e.g., secretaries) that received CWWA. Second, for any given function 
(e.g., police), across major occupational groups, the average wage of 
employees in heavily "female" occupations (e.g., clerical) would rise 
relative to the average wages of employees in heavily "male" occupations 
(e.g., patrolmen), as more employees in the former would be in the 
detailed occupational groups that received CWWA. Third, across func- 
tions, the average wage in heavily female-dominated functions (e.g., 
health and welfare) would rise relative to the average wage in heavily 
male-dominated functions (e.g., fire protection), as employees in the 
former would again be more likely to be in the detailed occupations 
that received CWWA. Finally, holding constant the existing distribution 
of public employees, the average wage of public employees would rise 
relative to the prices of other goods and services. 
It is natural to ask how such relative wage changes would affect he 
level and composition of public employment. To the extent that public 
employers' employment decisions are sensitive to their employees' wage 
rates, one would expect to observe the four types of relative wage 
changes leading, respectively, to the substitution of some male for some 
female employees within a function-occupation group, the substitution 
of some employment in male-dominated occupations for some employ- 
ment in female-dominated occupations (within a function), the substitution 
of some employment in male-dominated functions for some employment 
in female-dominated functions, and a decline in the aggregate level of 
public employment. For all these reasons, CWWA might be expected to 
lead to a decline in female employment. 
We should stress that the first two of these adjustments potentially 
occur because males and females may be substitutable in producing a 
given public service, the third potentially occurs because public-sector 
decision makers believe various public services are substitutable in 
producing utility for taxpayers/voters, and the fourth potentially occurs 
because public-sector decision makers believe that public services as a 
group are substitutable with private consumption in producing utility 
for taxpayers/voters. Hence, even if males and females are not substitutable 
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in the production of any given public service, comparable-worth wage 
adjustments might still lead to a decline in female employment in the 
sector through their effects on the overall level and functional composition 
of public employment. Previous research does in fact indicate that the 
overall level and functional composition of state and local government 
employment are sensitive to public employee wage rates.5 
One can, however, plausibly conceive of within-function within- 
major-occupation male/female substitution possibilities and within-func- 
tion across-major-occupation substitution possibilities in the state and 
local sector. For example, within the police clerical category, increased 
wages for secretaries (who are predominantly female) relative to the 
wages of radio dispatchers (who are often male) might lead to substitution 
of the latter for the former, as dispatchers might be required to type 
more of their own "paperwork" during slack periods. Similarly, again 
looking at police but this time across major occupation groups, increases 
in the average wage of civilian clerical workers (who are predominantly 
female) relative to patrolmen (who are predominantly male) might lead 
to substitution of the latter for the former, as patrolmen might be 
expected to handle more of their own paperwork. 
Of course, to say that one can conceive of such substitution possibilities 
does not mean that they actually occur. The state and local sector is 
heavily unionized, and union contract restrictions or civil service hiring 
systems in which position descriptions are narrowly defined may reduce 
the possibility of such forms of substitution occurring. As a consequence, 
Section II of this paper provides estimates of the extent to which these 
types of substitution actually occur in the state and local sector. 
Specifically, estimates of within-occupation male/female substitution and 
across-occupation occupational employment substitution are obtained, 
using data from the 1980 Census of Population. On the basis of these 
estimates and existing estimates of the demand for labor in the public 
sector, a crude simulation of the potential effects of CWWA on female 
employment in the public sector is presented in Section III. Finally, 
Section IV summarizes our findings and presents some brief concluding 
remarks. 
II. Across-Occupation Substitution and Within-Major- 
Occupation Gender Substitution in the State 
and Local Government Sector 
Our research strategy is to infer, from cross-sectional data on variations 
in state and local government employment and wage patterns across 
s See, e.g., Ashenfelter and Ehrenberg (1975) and the more recent references 
cited in Ehrenberg and Schwarz (in press). Note that, as long as the total state 
and local government employment budget does not increase by as much as the 
increase in the average wage of state and local government employees caused by 
CWWA, total employment in the sector must fall. 
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geographic areas, the extent to which state and local government 
employers ubstitute across major occupational categories as relative 
occupational wages change and substitute between males and females 
within a major occupational category as relative gender wages change. 
To perform such analyses, we require at a minimum estimates of state 
and local government employment and wages, by occupation and gender, 
disaggregated by state (for state employees) and by local area (for local 
government employees). The Census of Government does not fit our 
needs because it does not provide employment and wage data on an 
occupation or gender basis. Most national samples of individuals that 
provide mployment and wage data along with occupation and gender 
information (e.g., the monthly Current Population Sample or the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics) are also inappropriate b cause their sample 
sizes are much too small to calculate meaningful employment and 
average wage data for public employees by occupation, gender, and 
geographic area. 
As a result, our analyses use data from the largest recent publicly 
available data source that contains the necessary variables, the "A" 
sample of the 1980 Census of Population. The A sample is a 5% sample 
of the individuals in each state. We aggregate state employees' data by 
state and local government employees' data by SMSA to get samples of 
49 and 177 observations, respectively.6 The data were stratified into 
education and noneducation employees and, within each of these func- 
tions, into four occupational groups: professional nd managerial em- 
ployees (occupation codes [o.c.] 001-199); technical, sales, and adminis- 
trative-support employees (o.c. 203-389); service mployees (including 
protective s rvice) (o.c. 403-69); and all other employees (including craft, 
repair, laborer, and transportation-equipment operator) (o.c. 473-889).7 
6 There are three 1980 Census of Population public-use microdata samples (see 
U.S. Bureau of the Census 1983). The A sample is a 5% sample; it identifies 
which state each individual is in and, if he or she is in one of 180 SMSAs, which 
SMSA. The B sample is a 1% sample; it identifies whether an individual is in 
one of 282 SMSAs but not (in most cases) which state. Finally, the C sample is 
a 1% sample; it identifies only 27 states separately and no SMSAs. At the time 
our study was undertaken, only the largest sample, the A sample, was available 
to us; fortunately, itpermitted identification at both the state and the local level. 
Unfortunately, the data for Colorado (and its three SMSAs) were not available 
at Cornell University at that time (the tape had broken), hence our sample sizes 
of 49 states and 177 SMSAs. Researchers considering replicating or extending 
our analyses in the future might profitably consider merging data from all three 
samples to increase the number of SMSAs and to reduce sampling variation. 
7Small sample sizes within each cell do not permit further functional disag- 
gregation, and in what follows we ignore the possibility of functional substitution 
between education and noneducation employees. This assumption has been made 
by one of us in an earlier study (see Ashenfelter and Ehrenberg 1975); it seems 
plausible because educational services, especially at the local level, are typically 
provided by different governmental units than other services are (e.g., by school 
districts rather than cities). 
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For each observation, mean earnings and employment were calculated 
on a function/occupation/gender breakdown. Given the small sample 
sizes in each cell, especially for the SMSA sample, these estimates are 
subject to considerable sampling variability, variability that is exacerbated 
by the fact that the underlying individual data themselves came from a 
5% sample.8 
Suppose that within each of these occupational groups the quantity 
of labor service produced (L) is given by the constant elasticity of 
substitution function 
L =A [3QMM-B + (t 1- )QFF-B]-/B (1) 
where QM (QF) is a measure of the quality of males (females) employed 
in the occupation, M (F) is a measure of male (female) employment in 
the occupation, and A, B, and 5 are parameters. If the only cost of labor 
is the wage rate, it is well-known that cost minimization leads to the 
relative-demand equation 
log(M/F) = ao + a, log(WM/WF) + a2 1og(QM/QF), (2) 
where WM (WF) is the male (female) wage, and a, is an estimate of 
minus the elasticity of substitution between males and females in the 
occupation. 
Table 1 presents estimates for state employees of this relative-demand 
equation for each of the four occupational groups in education and 
noneducation. Equations are estimated with both relative employment 
and relative man-hours as the dependent variable. Each equation includes 
the logarithm of male to female earnings in the function-occupation cell 
(LR3) and, as proxies for the relative quality of males and females in the 
occupation, the logarithms of the ratio of average age (LR4) and average 
education level (LR5) of males to females in the function-occupation 
cell. In addition, to control for supply factors, some equations include 
the logarithm of a measure of the overall male/female wage ratio in the 
state (LZt) and the logarithm of the male/female labor force ratio in the 
state (LZ2). We expect the former to be negatively and the latter 
positively associated with male/female relative employment in the func- 
tion-occupation cell. 
8 The reader can refer to the notes to table 2 (below) to get an idea of how 
small the sample sizes in each cell in the SMSA sample actually are. For example, 
if we restrict the sample to observations inwhich there are at least eight males 
and eight females in the occupation/function cell from which to compute average 
wages and employment, we lose over three-quarters of the observations on the 
"all other" employees category. 
Table 1 
Within-Occupation Relative Employment and Hours Equations: 
1980 Census of Population State Employee Data, by State 
Noneducation Education 
M1* (2)t (3)t: (4)? M1* (2)t (3):: (4)? 
Employment: 
LR3 .846 .387 -.383 -.429 1.503 -.584 .046 -.615 
(1.3) (.9) (.8) (1.3) (2.1) (1.8) (.1) (2.0) 
LR4 -.118 -.154 .609 .678 1.581 -.699 .811 1.043 
(.1) (.2) (.8) (1. 1) (1.4) (1.2) (1.4) (2.2) 
LR5 .116 1.871 1.605 1.720 3.532 .732 1.176 -.697 
_2 (- 1) (1.6) (1.6) (2.6) (1.4) (.5) (1. 1) (.7) .000 .036 .000 .077 .375 .129 .00 .120 
LR3 .823 .224 -.154 -.431 1.393 -.484 -.014 -.645 
(1.5) (.5) (.3) (1.3) (2.0) (1.5) (.0) (2.0) 
LR4 -.308 -.313 .594 .801 1.740 -.673 .796 1.044 
(.3) (.5) (.8) (1.3) (1.6) (1.2) (1.4) (2.1) 
LR5 -.761 1.267 1.829 1.845 2.603 1.128 1.261 -.748 
(.6) (1.0) (2.0) (2.8) (1.0) (.9) (1.2) (.7) 
LZ1 -1.284 .097 -1.761 -2.368 .875 -1.184 -.066 .084 
(1.8) (.1) (1.8) (1.8) (.9) (1.3) (.0) (.0) 
LZ2 1.628 .678 -.601 1.522 .622 1.127 .352 -.379 
(3.5) (1.5) (-9) (1.8) (1.0) (2.0) (.4) (.4) R 2 .185 .076 .149 .117 .420 .165 .000 .081 
Hours: 
LR3 .803 .390 -.047 -.660 1.117 -.670 -.193 -1.108 
(1.2) (.7) (.0) (1.8) (1.5) (2.2) (.4) (2.6) 
LR4 .026 -.031 .647 1.108 1.918 -.135 1.218 1.891 
(.0) (.0) (.8) (1.6) (1.6) (.2) (2.0) (3.0) 
LR5 .038 2.448 2.110 2.301 4.759 1.673 .842 -1.212 
2 
(.0) (1.8) (1.9) (3.2) (1.8) (1.4) (.7) (.8) 
JR2 .000 .041 .023 .141 .355 .088 .028 .221 
LR3 .778 .152 .164 -.657 .975 -.594 -.239 -1.015 
(1.4) (.3) (.3) (1.8) (1.4) (1.9) (.5) (2.3) 
LR4 -.179 -.218 .669 1.257 2.125 -.081 1.183 1.905 
(.1) (.3) (.9) (1.9) (1.9) (.2) (1.9) (3.0) 
LR5 -.959 1.695 2.377 2.425 3.556 2.016 .982 -1.310 
(.7) (1.2) (2.3) (3.4) (1.4) (1.7) (.8) (.9) 
LZ1 -1.359 -.111 -2.013 -2.758 1.113 -.801 -.490 -1.614 
(1.9) (. 1) (1.9) (2.0) (1-2) (.9) (.4) (.7) 
LZ2 1.796 1.010 -.438 1.560 .810 .990 .581 .825 
_2 (3.8) (2.0) (.6) (1.7) (1.3) (1.8) (.7) (.6) 
.201 .109 .154 .181 .444 .114 .000 .195 
NOTE.-Absolute-value t-statistics are in parentheses. LR3 = logarithm ofthe ratio of average hourly 
earnings of male employees inthe category toaverage hourly earnings of female employees inthe category; 
LR4 = logarithm ofthe ratio of the average age of males to the average age of females in the category; 
LR5 = logarithm ofthe ratio f average ducation level of males to the average ducation level of females 
in the category; LZI = logarithm ofthe ratio f male mean weekly earnings of full-year full-time workers 
in the state to female mean weekly earnings of full-year full-time workers in the state; and LZ2 = logarithm 
of the ratio f male civilian labor force in the state to female civilian labor force in the state. 
* Professional and managerial employees. 
t Technical, sales, and administrative-support employees. 
i: Service m loyees (including protective s rvice). 
5 Other empNoloyees (including craft, repair, laborer, and transportation-equipment op rators). 
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Where statistically significant, the control variables (LR4, LR5, LZ1, 
and LZ2) all have the expected sign. Unfortunately, the evidence on the 
substitutability ofmales for females is much weaker. For noneducation, 
when relative employment is the dependent variable, there are no 
significant relative-wage lasticities. When relative man-hours is used 
(which probably is preferable), male/female substitution appears to occur 
only in the "other" category, where a 10% increase in the wage ratio is 
associated roughly with a 6.5% decrease in the hours ratio. Elasticities 
in this range and larger are observed for state employees in education in 
the technical, sales, and administrative-support andthe "other" categories. 
However, here seemingly perverse positive relative-wage coefficients are 
found in the professional category. 
Table 2 presents estimates of the relative-wage coefficients from 
similarly specified equations for local government employees, with 
Table 2 
Within-Occupational Relative Employment and Hours Elasticities 
with Respect to Relative Wages: 1980 Census of Population 
Local Employee Data, by SMSA 
Noneducation Education 
M1* (2)t (3)t: (4)? M1* (2)t (3):: (4)? 
Employment 
Aa .089 -.296 .169 -.186 .856 -.074 .057 .296 
(.5) (1-7) (.9) (.7) (2.1) (.2) (.3) (.9) 
Ab .089 -.277 .173 -.309 .725 -.095 .060 .273 
(.5) (1.7) (1.0) (1.1) (1.9) (.3) (.4) (.9) 
Ba -.091 -.102 -.015 -.185 .737 -.936 .029 1.230 
(.5) (-4) (.0) (.5) (1.9) (1.8) (.1) (3.0) 
Bb -.135 .013 -.015 -.320 .606 -.951 .028 1.211 
(.7) (.0) (.0) (.9) (1.6) (1.8) (.0) (2.2) 
Hours: 
Aa -.044 -.239 .155 -.242 .535 -.117 .116 -.040 
(.2) (1.3) (.3) (.9) (1.3) (.4) (.7) (.1) 
Ab -.044 -.221 .150 -.382 .396 -.134 .116 -.059 
(.3) (1.3) (.8) (1.4) (1.0) (.4) (.7) (.2) 
Ba -.199 .060 -.158 -.383 .417 -.981 .097 .957 
(1.0) (.2) (.5) (1.0) (1.0) (1.9) (.4) (2.5) 
Bb -.240 .175 -.159 -.512 .278 -.983 .096 .978 
(1.3) (.7) (.5) (1.4) (.7) (1.8) (.3) (2.5) 
Sample size: 
A 168 145 160 85 176 41 149 71 
B 136 95 128 49 175 24 103 41 
NOTE.-Absolute-value t-statistics are in parentheses. A = confined to SMSAs with more than four 
males and four females in the occupation i  the data; B = confined to SMSAs with more than eight males 
and eight females in the occupation i  the data; a = logarithms ofrelative age and relative education levels 
also included in the analysis; and b = logarithms ofrelative age, relative education levels, and male/female 
labor force ratio included in the analyses. 
* Professional and managerial employees. 
t Technical, sales, and administrative-support employees. 
t Service mployees (including protective s rvice). 
5 Other employees (including craft, repair, laborer, and transportation-equipment op rators). 
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SMSAs as the units of observation. To avoid errors induced by averages 
constructed from very small samples, the analyses here are restricted to 
SMSAs in which at least four (or eight) individuals of each gender were 
contained in the data for each occupation-function cell. While it would 
have been preferable to require a larger minimum number of observations 
in each cell, the tabulation of the resulting sample sizes from those 
restrictions that is also reported in table 2 suggests that even these 
restrictions substantially reduced the number of observations available. 
The results in table 2 do not strongly support the within-occupation 
male-female substitution hypothesis. There is some evidence, for both 
education and noneducation, that substitution takes place among technical 
and administrative-support employees. However, for education employees, 
in some specifications relative wages are positively associated with 
relative employment levels for both the professional and the "other" 
categories.' 
Taken together, the results in tables 1 and 2 do not strongly support 
the hypothesis that within broad occupational groups male/female 
employment ratios are negatively associated with male/female wage 
ratios. Whether this reflects the failure of substitution to exist, hetero- 
geneity induced by using broad occupational categories, large sampling 
errors in the data, or the omission of other important explanatory 
variables that prevent us from accurately identifying the underlying 
demand curves is unclear. Unfortunately, sample sizes within cells in 
these data are usually too small to permit tests of substitutability within 
finer occupational groups. 
If one assumes that substitution between males and females is not 
possible within these broad occupational groups, one can aggregate 
across sexes within groups to come up with estimates of the average 
wage paid in each occupation (w3). The data also permit the computation 
of the share of the payroll paid to each occupational group (St). One 
' As a referee has pointed out, one may question whether we have succeeded 
in identifying a structural relative demand curve in tables 1 and 2 or have merely 
estimated a reduced form that combines both demand and supply-side forces. In 
fact, we also estimated structural relative-demand curves in which relative 
employment was specified to be a function of relative wages and the relative- 
quality variables (LR4 and LR5), and an instrument for relative wages (based on 
the relative-quality variables and the supply-side variables [LZ1 and LZ2]) was 
used. The pattern of relative-wage coefficients obtained from this specification 
was quite similar to that reported in the text (although, as might be expected, 
the coefficients were less precise) and did not prove any more supportive of the 
within-occupation male-female substitution hypothesis. Since the data used in 
the analyses are grouped data, with differing numbers of individuals in each 
group, we also estimated these models by weighted least squares to try to correct 
for heteroscedasticity problems. Again, in no case did this substantially alter the 
pattern of results we obtained. 
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can thus estimate share equations (derived from translog expenditure 
functions) of the form 
4 
j=1 
to test whether substitution of employees across occupations occurs in 
response to changes in wages in the different occupations.10 
If such substitution occurs, given estimates of how CWWA would 
change the average wage in each occupation, one can then compute the 
resulting changes in factor shares and, holding the total employment 
budget constant, the change in total and female employment in each 
occupation. To these changes, one can add estimates of the employment 
changes caused by the response of the employment budget to the 
CWWA-induced change in the average wage in the sector and thus 
obtain an estimate of the overall effect of CWWA on female employment 
in the sector. 
As is well-known, the output-constant own-wage elasticity of demand 
(no) for each occupation is given by 
aii + S? -S, 
ni- S (4) ISi 
and each of these elasticities hould be negative." In addition, to satisfy 
the homogeneity property-that a doubling of all wages would not alter 
the share spent on each occupation-it is necessary that 
a,1 + a12 + a3 + a,4 = 0 (5) 
for each I. Finally, to satisfy the symmetry property-that the Allen 
elasticity of substitution of occupation i for occupation j be equal to the 
elasticity of occupation j for occupation i-it must be the case that 
aij = aji (6) 
for all i # j. The restrictions summarized in (4)-(6) provide a convenient 
10 Implicit in this formulation is the notion that public-sector decision makers 
have well-defined utility functions that depend on the per capita employment 
levels of various categories of public employees and that the parameters of these 
functions do not vary systematically with public-employee wages across areas. 
For discussions of this approach and analyses that use functional rather than 
occupational data, see Ehrenberg (1973) and Ashenfelter and Ehrenberg (1975). 
11 See Hamermesh (in press). 
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way of testing whether the data are consistent with the share equations 
specified in equation (3). 
Tables 3 and 4 provide estimates, for the state and local government 
samples, respectively, of the occupational share equations derived from 
the translog expenditure function. In each case estimates are provided 
of the unconstrained system, of the system with homogeneity imposed, 
and of the system with both homogeneity and symmetry imposed. Since 
the four occupational shares must sum to unity, the coefficients of any 
wage variable must sum across equations in each system to zero. Hence 
we infer the value of the coefficients of the last equation from estimates 
of the first three. The estimates are obtained using an instrument for 
each of the wage variables and an estimation method that takes account 
of the correlation of the error terms across equations.12 
These estimates provide mixed support for the translog specification. 
On the one hand, in three of the four systems (education/state, non- 
education/state, ducation/local) one cannot reject the hypothesis that 
the homogeneity and symmetry restrictions-(5) and (6)-are satisfied. 
On the other hand, the majority of the individual regression coefficients 
are statistically insignificantly different from zero in all the systems 
estimated. One senses that this contributes to the above results. Moreover, 
12 The need for instrumental v riables can be illustrated inthe two-occupation 
case. Let Mi (Fi) be the number of male (female) hours employed in occupation 
i and WMi (WFi) the wage rate of males (females) in occupation i.Then the shares 
(Si) and average wages (We) in the two occupations are given by 
=o- WMIMI + WFIFI 
WMIMI + WFIFI + WM2M2 + WF2F2 
S2 = WMIMI+WM2M2 
+ WF2F2 
WmMl + WFIF, + WM2M2 + WF2F2 
WMIMI + WFIFI 
= M-+F 
WM2M2 + WF2F2 
2 M2 +F2 
It is obvious that each Si is positively correlated with its own wage rate and 
negatively correlated with the other wage rate; these correlations would bias the 
coefficient estimates of eq. (3). To remove these mechanical correlations, instru- 
ments for the occupational wage rates are created by regressing these wage rates 
on median income in the area, area population, male and female wages in the 
area (state data only), and mean ages and education levels of males and females 
in the occupation. The system is then estimated using the three-stage l ast 
squares option in the SAS statistical package. Use of weighted least squares to 
correct for heteroscedasticity again did not yield substantially different results, 
so only the unweighted results are reported here. 
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Table 4 
Estimates of Local Government Translog Cost Functions SMSA Level 
Major Occupational Group Data: Instrumental Variables 
Education * Noneducationt 
LW1 LW2 LW3 LW4 LW1 LW2 LW3 LW4 
I. No 
restrictions: 
Si -.488 .410 .047 .037 .279 .487 -.687 .415 
(1.6) (1.9) (.2) (.3) (1.2) (1.2) (1.4) (.8) 
S2 .221 -.057 -.098 -.049 -.021 .735 -.495 .065 
(1.9) (.7) (1.2) (1.0) (.1) (2.8) (1.6) (.1) 
S3 .215 -.227 .045 -.039 -.270 -.277 .575 -.267 
(1.4) (2.2) (.4) (.6) (1.9) (1.1) (1.9) (.9) 
S4t .052 -.126 .006 .051 .012 -.945 .607 -.213 
II. Homogeneity: 
Si -.500 .414 .047 .040 .097 -.357 -.242 .503 
(1.8) (1.9) (.2) (.3) (.4) (1.4) (.5) (1.0) 
S2 .195 -.051 -.099 -.044 -.126 .250 -.240 .116 
(1.9) (.6) (1.2) (.9) (.9) (1.4) (.8) (.4) 
S3 .226 -.229 .046 -.041 -.181 .133 .359 -.311 
(1.6) (2.2) (.4) (.6) (1.3) (.8) (1.3) (1.0) 
S4t .079 -.134 .006 .045 .210 -.026 .123 .308 
III. Homogeneity 
and symmetry: 
Si -.522 .216 .222 .083 -.020 -.208 -.085 .313 
(1.9) (2.1) (1.6) (1.0) (.2) (2.4) (1.0) (2.8) 
S2 .216 -.002 -.148 -.065 -.208 .360 .010 -.161 
(2.1) (.0) (2.8) (2.1) (2.4) (3.6) (.1) (1.4) 
S3 .222 -.148 -.021 -.051 -.085 .010 .233 -.158 
(1.6) (2.8) (.3) (1.3) (1.0) (.1) (1.0) (.2) 
S4t .083 -.065 -.051 .033 .313 -.161 -.158 .006 
NOTE.-Absoute-value t-statistics are in parentheses. N = 177. LWt = logarithm of the average hourly 
wage in category 1; LW2 = logarithm of the average hourly wage in category 2; LW3 = logarithm of the 
average hourly wage in category 3; LW4 = logarithm of the average hourly wage in category 4; S1 = share 
of payroll spent on professional and managerial employees; S2 = share of payroll spent on technical, sales, 
and administrative support employees; S3 = share of payroll spent on service employees; S4 = share of 
payroll spent on all other employees. 
* F(3,516) = 0.93 (with the null hypothesis of homogeneity and the alternative hypothesis of no restrictions) 
and F(6,516) = 0.89 (with the null hypothesis of homogeneity and symmetry and the alternative hypothesis 
of no restrictions). 
t F(3,516) = 4.47 (with the null hypothesis of homogeneity [rejected at the .05 level] and the alternative 
hypothesis of no restrictions) and F(6,516) = 2.52 (with the null hypothesis of homogeneity and symmetry 
[rejected at the .05 level] and the alternative hypothesis of no restrictions). 
t Estimates are implied by the adding up property. 
the own-wage elasticities of demand that are implied when symmetry 
and homogeneity are imposed (table 5) are negative in only nine of the 
16 cases. 
III. Simulated Effects on Female Employment 
of a CWWA Policy 
The mixed nature of the above results suggests that one should take 
predictions they generate with a grain of salt. Nonetheless, this section 
illustrates how they can be used-along with knowledge of the share of 
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Table 5 
Estimates of Own Wage Elasticities of Demand for State 
and Local Government Employees by Occupation 
State Government Local Government 
Education Noneducation Education Noneducation 
Professional and managerial 
employees -.207 -.633 -.816* -.791 
(.731) (.453) (.820) (.280) 
Technical, sales, and 
administrative-support 
personnel -.880 -.276 -.961 .961 
(.147) (.267) (.068) (.205) 
Service employees 1.593* .303 -1.191 .750 
(.080) (.152) (.078) (.301) 
Other employees .850 .050 .005 -.757 
(.042) (.128) (.034) (.214) 
NOTE-Derived from own wage coefficients in tables 3 and 4 (homogeneity and symmetry constrained 
specifications), mean share of payroll spent on the category, and equation (4) in the text. Mean share of 
payroll is in parentheses. 
* Estimated based on statistically significant regression coefficient. 
expenditures on each category, the proportion of hours worked by 
females in each category, the male and female wages in each category, 
female employment in each category, and an assumption about what 
CWWA would do to female wages-to generate predictions about the 
effect of CWWA on female employment due to substitution away from 
female-dominated occupations, holding the total employment budget 
constant. The Appendix sketches somewhat formally how this is done. 
Illustrative simulations appear in table 6, where we have assumed that 
CWWA would raise the wage of all female employees by 20%.13 
Although the implied percentage change in female employment in 
each occupation varies across function (education or noneducation) and 
sector (state or local), the implied average change in overall female 
employment is remarkably similar across function and sector. A 20% 
increase in female wages is predicted to reduce female employment in 
education by almost 6% and female employment in noneducation by 
about 5.5%. These figures are the averages for all observations in the 
sample; as the bottom rows of table 6 suggest, the predicted losses vary 
across observations, with the range of predicted losses being larger for 
local government employees.14 
13 This figure is in the range of the wage-gap estimates between comparable 
males and females that we obtained in our analyses of formal job-evaluation data 
for state employees in Connecticut, Minnesota, nd Washington; see Ehrenberg 
and Smith (in press) for details. A lower figure would yield proportionately 
lower employment-loss e timates. 
14 The App. also indicates how one can compute the male percentage employ- 
ment loss in each sector. While we have not computed these for each observation 
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Table 6 
Implied Percentage Effects of a 20% CWWA for All Females on the 
Employment of Females in State and Local Governments due to 
Occupational Substitution: Total Employment Budget Held Constant 
State Employees Local Employees 
Education Noneducation Education Noneducation 
Mean percentage change in female 
employment in:
Professional and managerial 
employees -6.2 -8.7 -15.6 -12.5 
Technical, sales, and 
administrative-support 
personnel -4.9 -6.8 21.5 -3.9 
Service employees -6.0 2.8 14.4 -2.2 
Other employees -7.4 2.6 10.4 5.5 
Overall -5.9 -5.5 -5.9 -5.4 
Minimum change observation -4.3 -3.3 -1.3 .1 
Maximum change observation -9.3 -7.1 -12.1 -11.9 
SOURCE.-Authors' calculations using the method described in the App., the coefficients from the 
homogeneity and symmetry constrained regressions reported in tables 3 and 4, and the underlying census 
data. 
We must stress, however, that these simulations assume that the total 
employment budget remains constant in the face of the CWWA. This is 
roughly equivalent to assuming that in the aggregate the wage elasticity 
of demand for state and local government employees is unity. That is, 
they assume that any given increase in the average wage of state and 
local government employees would result in an equal percentage decrease 
in aggregate state and local government employment. 
In fact, studies of the aggregate (by function) wage elasticity of 
demand for state and local government employees typically find wage 
elasticities of demand that are less than unity.15 Thus an increase in the 
average wage would increase the total employment budget; the calculations 
in table 6 therefore overstate the decline in female employment that 
would occur. 
Some idea of the magnitude of the overstatement can be obtained 
from the following crude calculations. On the basis of knowledge of the 
ratios of male to female wages and of male to female hours in each 
function/sector, we calculate that a 20% increase in wages for females 
would increase the average wages of state education, state noneducation, 
and then taken the average of the losses across all observations, it is interesting 
to note that computations u ing the average male employment shares (across all 
observations) inthe sample yielded losses that were similar in magnitude to the 
females' losses for education but somewhat smaller (2%-3%) for noneducation. 
5 For a summary of the results from all these studies, see Ehrenberg and 
Schwarz (in press, table 3). 
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local education, and local noneducation employees by about 8%, 7.5%, 
11.5%, and 5.5%, respectively.16 It is reasonable to take -.5 as a "best" 
estimate of the aggregate-wage lasticity of demand for noneducational 
employees in the state and local sector and -.75 as the comparable 
estimate for educational employees.17 These elasticities imply employment- 
budget increases for state education, state noneducation, local education, 
and local noneducation, respectively, of 2%, 3.75%, 2.9%, and 2.75%. 
Such increases would reduce the female employment declines predicted 
in table 6 by roughly half. 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
Taken at face value, our simulations uggest that the decline in female 
employment in the state and local sector caused by a 20% CWWA for 
all female employees in the state and local sectors would be quite small, 
probably falling in the range of 2%-3%./18 These somewhat surprisingly 
small estimates are a direct result of our inability to find much substi- 
tutability of males for females within major occupational groups or 
much substitutability across major occupational groups as relative wages 
change. 
We do not place much confidence in these estimates, however, because 
in general they are based on statistically insignificant coefficient estimates. 
Whether the latter are due to heterogeneity induced by using broad 
occupational categories, large sampling errors in the underlying data, a 
failure to identify demand equations from these data, or our use of 
incorrect functional forms is unclear.19 Hence, until future research 
narrows our uncertainty about these estimates, we do not intend that 
policymakers place very much weight on them. Rather, we view the 
contribution of our paper as laying out a methodological approach for 
analyzing possible adverse employment effect of implementing comparable 
worth, an approach that might serve as a starting point for future 
empirical studies.20 
16 These are crude calculations that ignore the interoccupational substitution 
that would take place. 
17 Ehrenberg and Schwarz (in press, table 3). 
18 It is interesting tonote that a related study of legislated wage increases for 
females in Australia (Gregory and Duncan 1981) found much smaller esulting 
decreases in the rate of female mployment growth in the public sector than in 
the private sector. 
19 With respect to the latter point, we made no attempt o test whether 
functional forms other than the constant elasticity of substitution (within- 
occupation analyses) and the translog (across-occupation a alyses) "fit" the data 
better or even whether the implicit assumption of constant returns to scale was 
correct. 
20 Future researchers might consider using different functional forms and 
collecting additional variables that might permit improved identification f the 
demand equations. They also might consider merging data from the A, B, and 
C samples of the 1980 Census of Population to expand both the number of 
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We should also stress that a comparable-worth policy would have 
additional labor market repercussions. Some males in the sector would 
also lose their jobs, and, if these displaced males and females seek 
employment in the private sector, downward pressure will be placed on 
wages there. If a CWWA policy were confined to the public sector and 
displacement occurred, it is not obvious that women as a group would 
benefit; the higher wages for women employed in the public sector may 
be at least partially offset by resulting lower wages for women in the 
private sector. 
Alternatively, the policy might induce some of the displaced females 
to remain "attached" to the state and local sector in the hope of 
obtaining a now higher-paying job there in the future. Thus the policy 
might lead to "wait unemployment" among females. As is well-known, 
in this case the increase in female unemployment may exceed the number 
of females displaced by the increase in female wages in the public sector, 
and the direction that the female wage in the private sector would move 
would depend on demand elasticities in both sectors.21 
Of course, just as our simulations ignore spillover or queuing effects 
on private-sector labor markets, they also ignore the repercussions on 
the private sector of the method of funding comparable-worth wage 
increases. Throughout, we have assumed that such increases would not 
substitute for wage increases that public employees would otherwise 
receive, that is, that they would lead to an increase in the average wage 
in the public sector. As noted above, wage elasticities of demand in the 
state and local sector tend to be inelastic. Thus either higher state and 
local taxes or reductions in other state and local expenditures would be 
required to fund CWWA. Either of these events would have repercussions 
on employment in the private sector. 
Appendix 
Estimating Female Employment Losses Caused by CWWA 
due to Changes in the Occupational Mix 
Let Wmj be the wage of males in occupation /, WFj the wage of females 
in occupation j, and Pj the proportion of hours worked by females in 
the occupation. The average wage in the occupation, Wj, is given by 
SMSAs in the sample and the number of individuals observed in each state and 
SMSA. Finally, to avoid problems associated with the aggregation fgovernmental 
units and sampling, they might consider using alternative data files such as the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's EEO-4 data, an annual survey 
of all state and local governments that contains data by function, occupation, 
and gender. However, these data are not currently available publicly, and they 
have their own problems. Some of these problems are discussed by us elsewhere 
(Ehrenberg, Smith, and Straka 1986); this report is available on request. 
21 For a more extended iscussion of wait unemployment that draws heavily 
on Mincer (1976), see Ehrenberg and Smith (1985, chap. 12). 
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WI= WM1 (1 Pj)+ WFJPj (Al) 
Differentiating with respect to the female wage and then multiplying 
both sides by the ratio of the female wage to the average wage, one 
obtains 
(d Wj/I WF)(WFj Wj) jPJWWFJ+ (1 -Pj)WMJ (A2) 
or 
%/AW-;: %A WFj i( IA ~j % AWF7Pj + (1- Pj)(WMJ/WFJ) (A3) 
If CWWA lead to the same percentage increase in female wages in each 
occupation, c, then the percentage change they induce in the average 
wage in occupation J is 
CPj 
Pj +(1-Pj)(WMj/WFI) (A4) 
Now from the translog cost-function share equation (3) in the text 
4 4 
dS = L aijd log Wj E ajj(%AWj). (A5) 
j=1 j=1 
The share of expenditures pent on each occupational category is given 
by 
4 
Si = WjEj1 / WjEj, (A6) 
j=1 
where employment in each occupation, Ej, is measured in man-hours. If 
the total employment budget-the denominator of (A6)-is held constant, 
taking the logarithm of both sides and then the total differential, one 
obtains 
(l/Si)dSj = d log Si = d log Wi + d log Ei %A Wi + %Ej (A7) 
One can substitute (A5) into (A7) and solve for %AEi to obtain 
4 
%AEi ;ze[(l/Si) z aj1 (%AWj)] - %AWi (A8) 
j=1 
Equations (A4) and (A8) together yield the predicted percentage change 
in total employment in each occupation induced by the CWWA. 
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How would female employment change? Since we have assumed (on 
the basis of the results in tables 1 and 2) that CWWA would lead to no 
male/female substitution within an occupation, female employment 
would change in each occupation by the same percentage as total 
employment. As a result, if EFj is the initial level of female employment 
in occupation j (measured in hours), the overall percentage effect on 
female employment due to the changing occupational mix (/AEF) is 
given by 
4 4 
%AEF = 2 (%AEj)EFj/ EFj (A9) 
j=1 j=1 
Similarly, the overall percentage effects on males' employment due to 
the changing occupational mix (%/EM), is given by 
4 4 
%AEM = z (%AEj)EMJ/ Z EM}, (Al 0) 
j=1 j=1 
where EMj is the initial level of male employment in occupation j. 
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